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Abstract: 
This study is the first of its kind to test second level agenda building and setting effects in 
the course of a referendum campaign. Personal standardized interviews with 47 different 
campaign managers are linked to a content analysis of TV and newspaper coverage, and a 
three-wave public opinion survey. The results demonstrate the dynamic flow of arguments in the 
agenda building and setting process; top-down from the campaigners to the news media, and 
the public.  
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Referendum Campaign 1
Agenda Building and Setting in a Referendum Campaign. Investigating the Flow of 
Arguments among Campaigners, the Media, and the Public 
 
 The agenda setting function of the news media refers to the well-established effect that 
the repeated coverage about an issue raises the importance of that issue in the public’s mind. 
The first systematic study was conducted by McCombs and Shaw who found correlations 
between the media agenda and the public agenda.1 Over the last decades, researchers have 
accumulated strong evidence for agenda setting covering numerous issues in many countries 
and for all types of news media.2 Most agenda setting research since McCombs and Shaw’s 
seminal study has focused on the relationship between the media’s agenda and the public 
agenda (agenda setting). These studies combine a content analysis of news media with public 
opinion surveys. Other studies have examined the various factors that shape the agenda 
presented by the mass media (agenda building). This line of research mostly investigates the 
correlation between news releases of political candidates and the salience of these candidates 
in media content. For both agenda setting and agenda building, mass communication scholars 
have accumulated convincing evidence over the years, for local elections, national elections, 
and also during more quiescent political times. Taken together, agenda setting and agenda 
building research can look back at 400 published studies around the world from 1968 to the 
present day. 
 However, despite this immense research corpus, there are still some pressing and 
intriguing research gaps waiting for scholarly attention. To begin with, there are hardly any 
studies exploring how agenda building and agenda setting work together during a single 
campaign or election. Put differently, while we know that agenda setting and agenda building 
work, we lack a holistic picture on how the policy agenda finds its way to the media agenda, and 
finally to the public agenda. Of course, there are studies that focus on the relationship between 
two agendas; however, there are hardly any studies that can track the interdependencies 
between all agendas that are involved. Second, classic agenda setting and agenda building 
research has examined candidate salience in election campaigns or issue salience in local, 
national and international settings. However, no studies so far have examined these effects for 
direct referendum campaigns. Third, most studies investigating the agenda of political elites 
have used press releases as a measure of a candidates agenda. However, scholars were not 
able to conduct standardized interviews with all major campaigners. Compared to press 
releases, this would be an alternative and even a more direct measure of attribute salience. 
Fourth and last, agenda setting research is dominated by cross-sectional settings. These 
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designs have provided rich insights with real world data and gathered convincing evidence for 
both agenda setting and agenda building. However, cross-sectional studies are unable to portray 
the dynamics of a campaign over time, and they are unable to meet the basic requirements for 
establishing causality in agenda setting and agenda building research. 
 To address these four research gaps, this paper reports about an extensive real world 
study on a referendum campaign about the asylum law in Switzerland. More specifically, we 
have conducted interviews with elite campaigners from all major political camps and involved 
campaign organizations, collected data for a full content analysis of TV and newspaper coverage 
about those camps, and gathered public opinion data with a three-wave-panel survey. Unlike 
prior research in this field, our study is unique by covering second-level agenda building and 
setting effects in a single study using the same measures for all three data sets. Finally, it is the 
first study of its kind investing these kinds of effects for a referendum campaign. 
 
Literature Review 
First and Second Level Agenda Setting. In their seminal Chapel Hill study, McCombs and 
Shaw observed a relationship between the pattern of news coverage of the 1968 presidential 
election and the key issues of the campaign that the public perceived as important.3 The core 
concept of agenda setting research is issue salience. Issue salience has been described as the 
degree to which an issue is perceived as important, especially relative to other issues.4 
Research over the past thirty-five years has supported the transferal of issue salience to public 
salience. In this process, agenda-setting is not operative in a universal fashion as a plethora of 
limiting and contributing variables qualify this media effect. These are, for instance, media 
reliance5, issue obtrusiveness6, interpersonal communication7, the optimal time span8, or need 
for orientation.9 
 Recently, the emergence of the second level of agenda-setting has prompted a deeper 
understanding of agenda-setting effects. The second level of agenda-setting refers to a process 
similar to the transferal of issue salience: Instead of examining an agenda of issues, this line of 
research investigates an agenda of attributes. The two levels of agenda-setting also imply 
different types of information processing. While first level agenda-setting involves issues, second 
level agenda-setting refers to more specific characteristics of objects. These objects can be sub-
issues or specific aspects and selections of issues, such as candidate characteristics or issue 
arguments (cognitive attributes).10 Furthermore, the second level of agenda-setting also 
incorporates specific evaluations or journalistic assessments of issues (affective attributes).11 
Several studies have produced extensive support for this theorizing. McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-
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Escobar, and Rey found a positive correlation between the media agenda and the voter agenda 
for cognitive and affective object attributes.12 Golan and Wanta documented second level effects 
in an analysis of the 2000 presidential primary in New Hampshire.13 Beside those field studies, 
Kiousis, Bantimaroudis, and Ban provided experimental evidence for the transferal of attribute 
salience.14 
 
First and Second Level Agenda Building. Apart from the transferal of issue or object salience 
to the public, scholars have studied the influences on news media agendas, a type of research 
that Dearing and Rogers have named agenda building.15 Gandy was one of the first to suggest 
to “go beyond agenda-setting to determine who sets the media agenda, how and for what 
purpose it is set, and with what impact on the distribution of power and values in society”.16 
Weaver, McCombs and Shaw identify three major sources that exert an influence on the media 
agenda: a) influential news sources such as the president or political elites, b), other elite media 
sources (intermedia agenda setting), and c), social norms and traditions of journalism.17 
Traditionally, studies investigating the agenda building process of political elites have relied on 
news releases. For instance, Turk showed that state government news releases can increase 
the public salience of state agencies in subsequent media coverage.18 In a study on a political 
campaign, Kaid could demonstrate that newspapers incorporated candidate news releases 
exactly as they were disseminated.19 Beyond the first level of agenda building, other studies 
have investigated how issue attributes put forth by elites have found their way into media 
coverage (second level agenda building). Huckins, for instance, investigated the building of the 
media agenda by an influential interest group that succeeded to set the media agenda between 
1992 and 1994.20 
 As should be apparent from the previous section, there is convincing evidence for 
agenda setting and agenda building, both at the issue and at the attribute level. However, there 
are hardly any studies that have tracked the full flow of issue or attribute salience, from political 
elites to the news media, and finally to the public. Rare exceptions are first, a study by Kiousis et 
al. that investigated the building of the agenda in print media by candidates in the 2002 Florida 
gubernatorial election, and the setting of the public agenda by the media21, and second, a study 
by Kiousis, Popescu and Mitrook that investigated the same linkages between the press 
releases of 28 U.S. companies, media coverage of the key issues and public opinion in 2005.22 
 
Argument Agenda Setting in Referendum Campaigns. The review of previous studies shows 
that there is a large body of literature investigating (second level) agenda building and agenda 
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setting effects. However, little is known about how these processes work for referendum 
campaigns. The study of campaign effects has been predominantly focused on elections. 
Moreover, most of the research has been conducted in the United States.  Thus, the body of 
evidence is extremely scarce for agenda setting processes in non-American campaigns. In 
addition, we know even less about the process of the flow of communication in direct-democratic 
campaigns. 
 But why do referendum campaigns matter to the study of agenda setting and building, 
and why are they special? In referendum campaigns, several parties, NGOs, and other 
organizations form strategic camps; in most instances, one camp opposing the referendum and 
one camp supporting it. The camps are usually created by forming naturally predictable, 
pragmatic, or even “strange” strategic alliances. In this process, political parties are not the only 
actors involved in a campaign. In some campaigns, parties even make up only a minority of all 
involved actors, as citizens’ interest groups, churches, or NGOs can play a very decisive role. 
This makes referendums less predictable than regular elections. As de Vresse states, “while 
longer-term factors such as partisanship or ideology have been found to be important in national 
elections, the shortterm impact of campaign strategies and tactics can make a substantial 
difference in determining referendum outcomes.”23 Even more importantly, contrary to regular 
democratic elections, no specific candidates exclusively appear in the debate, simply because 
no candidates are voted for. Thus, voters cannot take candidate cues such as candidate image 
as a heuristic for their judgment.24 The crucial difference to voting campaigns is, therefore, that 
the campaign debate is centered on specific arguments, in favor or opposing the referendum. 
Each camp tries to promote their arguments in the debate, and the camp with the most salient 
and thus most compelling arguments wins the referendum.  
 In terms of agenda setting, those arguments are cognitive issue attributes.25 Argument 
salience in a referendum debate can thus be regarded as the second level of agenda setting. 
The basic idea is that each camp tries to establish their arguments in media coverage. The 
higher the correlation between the arguments of one camp and the corresponding arguments in 
the media coverage, the higher is the second level agenda building function of that camp. 
Likewise, the higher the correspondence between the arguments in the media and the public 
salience of those arguments, the higher is the second level agenda setting effect. It is important 
to note that the arguments are transported by the media; usually there is no direct way for a 
camp to communicate their respective arguments. Following this line of reasoning, it is clear that 
media reliance becomes a crucial variable in the agenda setting process. When citizens do not 
rely on the media, agenda setting effects are unlikely to occur. Researchers have found strong 
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evidence for the role of reliance26, and thus we can assume that media reliance is a crucial 
moderator for second level agenda setting effects. 
 
Study Context and Hypotheses 
 In a national referendum in September 2006, the Swiss citizens accepted a new asylum 
law with 68% in favor and 32% against the referendum. The referendum was launched by the 
left who tried to fight a tightening of the asylum law that the centre-right had established in 
parliament. The battle line was between two camps, one camp in favor of the law (i.e., pro 
tightening asylum policy), and one camp against the new asylum law (i.e., against a tightening of 
asylum policy). The camps did not only include political parties, but also a large number of other 
organizations were mobilized, e.g.,  organizations that support refugees and foreigners, religious 
organizations, business interest associations, and some domain-specific organizations 
defending the Swiss national tradition.27 Taken together, 47 different organizations were 
mobilized in this referendum, 32 belonged to the camp opposed to a tightening of the asylum law 
(contra camp), and 15 belonged to the camp that favored a tightening (pro camp). The contra 
camp included the Social Democrats, the Greens, the Forum for the Integration of Migrants, the 
Solidarité sans frontières, the Swiss Aid for Refugees, the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions, 
Amnesty International, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, the Swiss Red Cross, the 
Young Socialists, and others. On the other side, the pro camp gathered organizations such as all 
political parties of the moderate (FDP, CVP) and the populist right (SVP), the Federal Ministry of 
Justice and Police (EJPD), the Federal Office of Migration (BFM), the Swiss Employers’ 
Association, the Association of Small Businesses and Trade, the Association for an Independent 
and Neutral Switzerland, the Liberal Party, and others. 28 It is important to note that all those 
organizations actively joined the debate, launched a campaign trying to establish their 
arguments in the media and the public. This unique constellation demonstrates that referendum 
campaigns are multifaceted and truly different to election campaigns where two political parties 
try to promote a particular candidate. How agenda setting works in a referendum campaign is, 
therefore, a hitherto unresolved and very pressing research question. 
 In order to answer this question, we have, first, interviewed all organizations involved in 
the campaign. Second, we have conducted an extensive content analysis of relevant media 
coverage. Third, we gathered public opinion data in a three wave panel study. With all these 
data at hand, the major aim of this paper is to analyze the flow of arguments from both camps to 
media coverage, and from media coverage to the public. Based on previous research in agenda 
building, we assume that there is a significant correlation of campaign arguments with salient 
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arguments in the media. This relationship should be observable for the arguments of the pro 
camp, and for the arguments of the contra camp. Therefore, the following two second level 
agenda building hypotheses H1a and H1b can be derived: 
H1: The salience of arguments favored by the pro camp (H1a), and the salience of 
arguments favored by the contra camp (H1b) will be positively related to the salience of 
arguments in media coverage. 
 In order to investigate the full flow of arguments, the second hypothesis concerns the 
second level of agenda setting. It can be assumed that salient arguments in the media will also 
be the salient arguments for the public. However, based on previous research, it can be 
expected that this relationship only holds true when the public relies on the mass media. When 
there is no media reliance, media salience and public salience are thought to be unrelated. This 
leads us to hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
H2: The salience of arguments in media coverage will be positively related to public 
argument salience for citizens with high media reliance (H2a), but not for citizens with low media 
reliance (H2b). 
 
Method 
The hypotheses were tested with data covering interviews with all relevant campaign 
actors, a media content analysis, and a public opinion panel survey. All data collection 
procedures exclusively investigated the referendum debate on the asylum law. At the heart of 
our analysis, we have chosen the seven key arguments prevailing the debate. Those key 
arguments were selected through an examination of news releases, PR-material, and the 
parliamentary debate concerning the referendum. Asylum policy is not a new issue, so selecting 
the key arguments from past debates and previous material was deemed appropriate. Table 1 
shows the arguments; four arguments are proposed by the pro camp, and the remaining three 
are advocated by the contra camp. In order to measure the salience of those arguments, all 
measures were applied exactly the same way in all three data sources. 
 
Interviews with Elite Campaigners. The relevant campaign organizations were identified 
based on parliamentary debates, voting recommendations, previous media coverage, and 
campaigners’ web sites. By doing so, 47 relevant political parties and organizations were 
identified. For each organization, we did a standardized interview with the campaign manager. 
All campaign managers agreed to participate which is not unusual for small countries such as 
Switzerland. Personal interviews were conducted (and recorded on tape) by two trained scholars 
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with an MA in political science before the referendum vote, in June 2006. The average duration 
of an interview was 60 minutes. 32 organizations belong to the contra camp and 15 to the pro 
camp. This difference in size is due to the fact that the contra organizations came from more 
diverse backgrounds.29 
The interviews contained many questions on campaign tactics, campaign outcomes, or 
campaign funding. As the central variable of this paper, argument salience was measured by 
asking the question of how important each argument (see table 1) is for the respective 
organization. More specifically, each argument was presented to the campaigners in exactly the 
same wording as it was presented in the public opinion survey and measured in content 
analysis. The questions had to be answered on a 5-point Likert scale. This results in a data set 
with N = 47 cases, splitting in two camps. 
 
Media Content. The content analysis (N=3314) started in early June 2006 and ended with the 
last CATI-interview of the third panel wave at the end of September, 2006. This makes an 
overall period of nearly four months. The unit of analysis was the argument. Five TV formats of 
both German- and French speaking television in Switzerland were sampled, including prime time 
news formats. All news items were sampled that dealt with the asylum law in particular or 
asylum policy in general. The sample of print media included both elite and non-elite media 
sources of the German and the French part of Switzerland.30  
In order to measure argument salience, it was coded whether an argument was present in 
news coverage or not. Coding was performed by four trained graduate students fluent in both 
languages. As a reliability check revealed, average agreement for all coders was sufficient 
(Holsti´s R = .87). 
The sample was divided into three periods, the first ranging from the beginning of the 
content analysis to the first wave of the panel survey, the second from the first to second wave 
of the survey, and the third ranging from the second wave of the survey to last interview of the 
third panel wave. An indicator of argument salience was construed for all three periods as the 
total number of arguments mentioned in each period in relation the number of all arguments of 
that period. The more often an argument was mentioned, the higher its salience. 
 
Panel Survey. The three wave panel survey was conducted by means of RDD computer 
assisted telephone interviews (CATI). A renowned global polling company programmed the 
questionnaire, pretested the study, and performed all interviews. The first wave covered 1725 
interviews, in July 2006. 52.2% of the participants were female, the average age was 48.51 
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(SD=17.11) years. The second panel wave took place in August 2006 with 1415 persons 
participating again. The third wave took place shortly after the referendum with 1049 persons 
participating again. It’s a representative national survey for the German and French speaking 
parts of Switzerland. 
For each of the above mentioned arguments, argument salience was assessed by the 
question: “Have you ever heard the following argument?” The arguments were applied in exactly 
the same way as in the other two data sources. To measure media reliance, participants were 
asked the following question: “How important is the following media source for you in order to 
get informed about politics such as the asylum law?” This question was asked with respect to TV 
and newspaper. The answers were summed up to an overall index of media reliance 
(Cronbachs Alpha = 0.726). The idea behind this index was that people who regard news media 
as very important to get informed have generally a high media reliance. The sample was split in 
two groups by means of a median split. As a control, political orientation was measured on a 10-
point scale by asking individuals to place themselves on the scale from left-wing to right-wing (1 
= left, 10 = right). 
 
Data Analysis. We have three data sets and for all three data sets, we have measured the 
same seven arguments. In order to combine those data sets, we have to use a statistical 
technique that can be applied to all data sets at the same time. Therefore, an individualized 
combination of content analysis and panel data is not possible. As common in almost all agenda 
setting studies that work with such complex real life data, we have chosen rank-order 
correlations (Spearman's Rho) as the chief statistical test. This seminal technique31 is not 
without its flaws; however, it is the only one that allows a straight forward and easy combination 
of the relevant data sets. The logic is intuitive: Arguments were ranked according to their 
salience in all three data sets. For the interviews with campaign organizations, a rank order was 
calculated for the pro and the contra camp respectively. For the content analysis, a rank order of 
arguments was calculated for all three phases. Likewise, we calculated a rank order of 
arguments for every panel wave, and for respondents with high and low media reliance.  
 
Results 
In our first two hypotheses (H1a and H1b), we hypothesized that there is a significant 
correlation between the arguments put forth by campaign strategists and argument salience in 
the media. Table 2 shows the rank-order correlations for the pro camp, the contra camp, and for 
all three time periods. As can be seen, there is no significant correlation between the salient 
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arguments of the contra camp and argument salience in the media. In other words, the contra 
camp does not succeed in establishing their arguments in news coverage. Throughout the whole 
campaign, arguments that are very salient in the news media (i.e., arguments having a high 
rank), are not the arguments put forth by the contra camp. In contrast, we can find a significant 
correlation between the pro camp arguments and the salience of those arguments in the media. 
This relationship is significant for all three waves. Therefore, we can generally demonstrate a 
second level agenda building effect, however, the voices of the contra camp remained largely 
unheard. That is, the mass media adopt the agenda of arguments of the proponents but not the 
agenda of the opponents of stricter asylum law. Thus, hypothesis H1a but not H1b can be 
confirmed. 
Our next two hypotheses focused on the second level of agenda setting effects. We 
assumed to find a significant relationship between argument salience in the media and public 
argument salience for individuals with high media reliance (H2a). For individuals with low media 
reliance, we expected no such effects (H2b). Confirming H2b, there is no significant correlation 
between the two agendas for people that have reported low media reliance. Put differently, the 
salient arguments of low reliance individuals did not correspond to the salient arguments in the 
media throughout the whole campaign. As table 3 reveals, there is a significant correlation 
between media salience and public salience for high reliance individuals. However, this 
relationship does evolve in the course of the campaign. There is a steady rise of correlations 
from wave one to wave three, only at wave three, however, these correlations reach statistical 
significance. Obviously, the cumulated exposure to media content in the course of the whole 
campaign led to this significant second level agenda setting effect. In order to interpret this 
finding, we have to keep in mind that we have measured the extent to which audience members 
have heard of an argument. In wave one, only a small part of the public has heard those 
arguments, and therefore, the correlation between media salience and public salience is rather 
low. By the time of wave 3, however, repeated exposure to salient arguments in mass media 
reporting ensured a high salience of the arguments on the public agenda.  
Additionally, we looked at the stability of public salience from wave one two wave 3. For 
individuals with high media reliance, the stability of argument salience from wave one to wave 
three is rather low and not significant (Rho = .51, n.s.). However, there is a high stability of 
argument salience from wave one to wave three for respondents with low media reliance (Rho = 
.89, p< .001). In other words, people with high media reliance were more volatile; they were 
more influenced by the campaign compared to people with low media reliance. This result does 
confirm hypotheses H2a and H2b.  
Referendum Campaign 10
In order to understand the full flow of arguments, we did some additional analyses. To 
begin with, we have examined the relationship between argument salience for the pro and the 
contra camp and public argument salience. The results are depicted in table 4. As can be seen, 
there is no correspondence between argument salience of both campaign camps and public 
salience for citizens with low media reliance. All depicted correlations do not reach statistical 
significance. Obviously, individuals with low media reliance were not interested in the asylum 
law, so their agenda does not correspond to the agenda of the mass media and political 
campaigners. However, for pro camp arguments, we can find a significant correlation for 
individuals with high media reliance. As table 4 reveals, there is an obvious rise of correlations 
from Rho = .11 (n.s.) for wave one, Rho = .40 (n.s.) for wave two, and finally, Rho = .83 (p<.001) 
for wave three. This means, at wave three, the argument agenda of the pro camp significantly 
corresponds to public salience of arguments. Of course, this does not mean that there is a direct 
effect from the campaign to the public. In contrast, this result illustrates that the arguments put 
forth by the pro camp were successfully implemented in media coverage, and finally reached the 
public. Consequently, the pro camp succeeded with the fundamental goal of every campaigner: 
To steer media attention and to impose a dominant argumentation on the audience.   
Still the question remains, why the contra camp did not succeed in imposing their agenda 
of arguments? It seems reasonable to assume that the contra camp did, at least, reach its own 
partisans. Therefore, we have divided the survey sample into the political left and the political 
right by our political orientation measure. Interestingly, there is no correspondence between the 
arguments of the contra camp and the arguments of politically left respondents (Wave three, 
Rho = -.07, n.s.). Less surprising, there is also no correlation between contra camp argument 
salience and right wing respondents (Rho = .25, n.s.). In contrast, there is a correlation between 
argument salience of the pro camp and right wing respondents (Rho = .70, p< .05), and again, 
no significant correlation between pro camp argument salience and left wing respondents (Rho = 
.38, n.s.). This means, while the pro camp has reached its own partisans with their arguments 
(through the mass media), the contra camp failed to bring out their argument agenda to their 
own discipleship.  
 
Discussion 
Compared to “usual” party elections, referendum campaigns are special. In referendums, 
no political candidates exclusively appear in the public spotlight, and thus, campaign tactics built 
on candidate personality, a candidate’s history, or candidate horse race are not relevant. As a 
matter of fact, referendum campaigns are about arguments. The flow of arguments from political 
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elites to the media and to the public will be decisive for the campaign outcome. This study was 
the first of its kind to test the impact of second level agenda setting and building in a referendum 
campaign. The results of this study demonstrate the full flow of arguments, top down, from the 
political elites to the news media, and to the public. More specifically, it was shown that the 
proponents of the asylum law did succeed in bringing their argumentation into news coverage 
which, in turn, increased public salience for their agenda. As the outcome of the referendum 
demonstrates, this campaign success made them win the vote. In addition to that, the results 
have also shown that the mass media have no direct or uniform effect on all audience members. 
In fact, only those individuals that heavily relied on the mass media for political information were 
influenced by salient media arguments. Individuals with low media reliance have kept their eyes 
and ears shut, and therefore, the campaign yielded no effects whatsoever for this group.  
In practical terms, we have learned that the contra camp failed to communicate their 
agenda, as the media simply did not adopt it. In order to interpret this, we have to take the 
general political climate of Switzerland into account. From past referendums about asylum 
policy, the outcome of the referendum was rather predictable. This fact was also acknowledged 
by both camps in our interviews. Given long-term public opinion data, the pro camp generally 
expected to win and did tell us so. For the contra camp, in contrast, some campaign planners 
admitted that they see minimal chances to win the vote. Nevertheless, they were heading for the 
fight for reasons of public reputation, credibility, and fundamental values.32 Keeping this in mind, 
it can be speculated that the media favored the arguments of the winning side. If so, there could 
be many explanations for this. One possible rationale could be that news media are always in a 
struggle to win audiences and sustain readership, and therefore, they chose to give the public to 
some extent simply what it demands. Beside this speculation, it is also noteworthy that the 
contra camp did not even reach its own left wing followers in the broad public.  
Another aspect that has been revealed in the interviews that helps to understand our 
findings: In contrast to the opponents of a tighter asylum law, the strategy of the proponents was 
more efficient: They denied the most important arguments of their adversaries less than the 
opponents did. For instance, the most important argument of the contra camp was the third most 
important argument for the pro camp. Conversely, the contra camp judged the most important 
argument of their adversaries as the least important argument in the political discourse. Thus, by 
discrediting their political adversaries, the contra camp may have adopted a position that had 
been considered as too extreme, both in the mass media arena and in the broader public. Put 
bluntly, when you deny all other arguments, you are given a hard time in a debate, as you can 
only push your very own arguments to the agenda, but not others. In contrast, when you are 
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supporting a tightening of asylum policy, and furthermore even acknowledge and use the 
arguments of the contra camp, you have a much more powerful arsenal of arguments. Similar 
results had been obtained in early persuasion studies on the effects of one-sided versus two-
sided communication and refutational versus non-refutational appeals.33 This could be a hint that 
the wrong argumentation was chosen by contra camp campaign planners, and that other 
arguments might have been more appropriate and successful.  
Beyond the specific context of the asylum law campaign, our study is unique in several 
aspects. First of all, as one of the first in the scholarly study of agenda building, we have 
conducted a huge amount of interviews with all relevant campaigners that were involved in the 
referendum. These data provide extremely rich and unique insights into campaign tactics. Such 
data are the most direct measure of a strategic actor’s agenda. Conducting standardized 
interviews with the major campaigners, and letting them answer the very same standardized set 
of arguments, is certainly better and more reliable than content analyzing campaign outlets such 
as political advertising or press releases. As another advantage of this study, we jointly observed 
agenda building and agenda setting in one single study. Related to that, we were able to track 
the dynamic success of the campaign over time. By conducting a panel survey, we could 
observe an increase of correlations between the agendas over a period of several months. This 
result gives support for the idea that real world agenda building and setting effects have to be 
understood as cumulative, long-term effects. Interestingly, a recent study by Son and Weaver 
comes to the same conclusion.34 Although short-term effects can be demonstrated in the 
laboratory, it is the pushing of a whole agenda of arguments over a period of time that can exert 
a measureable influence on public opinion. Phrased with a common saying, one could say: 
“Constant dripping wears away the stone”. 
Notwithstanding the rich and methodologically demanding data, there are some 
drawbacks of the present study that need to be carefully considered. To begin with, we have 
used rank-order correlations as the statistical procedure to observe agenda building and setting 
effects. Although this might be the only way to jointly analyze these rich sets of data, this 
technique has many flaws and is, of course, not suited to establish full causality. Second, we 
have assumed that survey respondents have actually read the articles and news stories we have 
content analyzed. As should be apparent, it is not possible to control that every news story or 
newspaper article in the content analysis was relevant to our respondents. Third, we have to 
consider that interviews with political campaigners might lead to a desirability bias as some 
campaigners will play their cards close to the chest. Beside these limitations, we nevertheless 
believe that such large-scale real world studies are not without its merits. Of course, the gain in 
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external validity comes at a cost of internal validity. However, such data allow insights into the 
intertwined relationship between mass communication and society that are hard to accomplish 
otherwise. Therefore, a fruitful cross-fertilization would result from the joint accomplishment of 
large scale multi-method studies like the present one coupled with smaller studies that can 
establish a truly causal link between the agendas. 
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Table 1 
Arguments put forth by the Pro Camp and the Contra Camp 
Pro Camp Contra Camp 
The abuse of asylum policy must be stopped. The humanitarian tradition of Switzerland must 
be maintained. 
The execution of asylum politics must be more 
efficient. 
The rights of asylum seekers have to be 
protected. 
Switzerland is too attractive for asylum 
seekers. 
Foreign people contribute to the social and 
cultural quality of Switzerland. 
There are already too many foreigners in 
Switzerland. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Correlation between Campaign Camp Argument Salience and Media Argument Salience 
 
 Argument Media 
Salience Wave 1 
Argument Media 
Salience Wave 2 
Argument Media 
Salience Wave 3 
Argument Salience 
Pro Camp 
.85** .79* 
 
.86** 
Argument Salience 
Contra Camp 
.29 .11 .23 
Note: Note: * p<.01, ** p<.001 
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Table 3 
Correlation between Media Argument Salience and Public Argument Salience for Individuals 
with High and Low Media Reliance 
 High Media Reliance Low Media Reliance 
 Argument 
Public 
Salience 
Argument 
Public 
Salience 
Argument 
Public 
Salience 
Argument 
Public 
Salience 
Argument 
Public 
Salience 
Argument 
Public 
Salience 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Argument Media 
Salience Wave 1 
.07 .25 .79* -.21 .07 .00 
Argument Media 
Salience Wave 2 
.21 .32 .82** -.31 .00 -.14 
Argument Media 
Salience Wave 3 
.29 .47 .92** -.16 .18 .07 
Note: Note: * p<.01, ** p<.001 
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Table 4 
Correlation between Campaign Camp Argument Salience and Public Argument Salience for 
Individuals with High and Low Media Reliance 
 High Media Reliance Low Media Reliance 
 Argument 
Public 
Salience 
Argument 
Public 
Salience 
Argument 
Public 
Salience 
Argument 
Public 
Salience 
Argument 
Public 
Salience 
Argument 
Public 
Salience 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Argument Salience 
Pro Camp 
.11 .40 .83** .02 .29 .27 
Argument Salience 
Contra Camp 
-.50 .-.36 .00 .64 .64 .64 
Note: Note: ** p<.001 
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